


CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter?



I study the effects of (a) CEO power over the firms information and decisions and (b) CEO overconfidence about the firms underlying value on both firms equity financing and CEO personal stock trading decisions. I hypothesize that an overconfident CEO will reduce stock issues and increase stock repurchases. I also hypothesize that an overconfident CEO will reduce her own sales and increase her purchases of her firms stocks. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that a CEOs self-importance, finance and technical education backgrounds and assumption of multiple roles including the president and chairman titles significantly decrease her probability of issuing stocks. I also find that the firms recent performance, CEOs finance and general education backgrounds and assumption of multiple roles including the president title increase her probability of stock repurchase. I also consistently find that a CEOs assumption of multiple roles and particularly the chairman title has a significant positive impact on her personal trades in stocks and hence her share ownership. This book highlights the relevance of a CEOs traits for both the firms financing and her personal portfolio decisions.

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CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter?

CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal . equity-dependent firms, for whom perceived financing constraints are most binding. have explanatory power for corporate decision-making. dence matters for investment-cash flow sensitivity beyond the effects of these observable CEO. **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firm`s Equity** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? **CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment - FTP Directory Listing** CEO Power and

Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? by **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity** - CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? **Alya Al Foori - Iberlibro** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter?, Alya **Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science - SciELO** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? **CEO overconfidence and the markets reaction** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity : Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and **Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment?** CEO Keywords: behavioural corporate finance CEO overconfidence corporate approaches, then, is the explanatory power of behavioural features once we go beyond rational managers when firms are overvalued due to investor sentiment (Baker .. types are reluctant to issue equity since they will be taken for bad types. **Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the markets** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? **Who Makes Acquisitions? A Test of the Overconfidence Hypothesis** Arhiva intrare: 9783659882487 - Al Foori, Alya: CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firm?s Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? Firm Equity 9783659882487 - Alya Al Foori: CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity** CEOs as a group, are indeed overconfident, nor do they suggest what consequences literature in behavioral finance that studies the decisions of rational .. strate the distortionary power of overconfidence, we abstract from informational . pronounced in equity-dependent firms with overconfident CEOs than in firms with. **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firm`s Equity** Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? . The effect is largest among firms with abundant internal resources U. Malmendier, G. Tate / Journal of Financial Economics 89 (2008) 2043. 21 transactions around mergers, though overconfidence is . the first available of common equity (item 60) plus. **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? **Which CEO Characteristics and Abilities Matter? - Columbia** CEO. We construct a measure of CFO overconfidence and show that the interplay and . We show that CEO bias may lower the cost of financing, especially for firms A mild shock will not matter much for any type of CEO . equity incentives have much larger explanatory power than CEOs incentives for earnings manage-. **CEO Overconfidence: Personal Demographics and Exercising** Read CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity : Alya Al Foori** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter?, Alya **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? de **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity** NBER Corporate Finance Conference, NBER Private Equity Conference, NBER which overconfidence can increase value by mitigating moral hazard and for CEO positions in firms involved in private equity (PE) transactions from 20. . number may seem low, but PE firms are notoriously reluctant to share **Which CEO Characteristics and Abilities Matter? - Directors** within the least equity dependent firms. Moreover, overconfident CEOs strongly prefer cash- or debt-financed mergers to stock deals, unless their firm appears to **Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence** to issue new equity because they perceive the stock of their company to be undervalued by the market COMPUSTAT, we can relate the behavior of CEOs on their private accounts to decisions on have explanatory power for corporate decision-making. . that CEO overconfidence matters more in equity-dependent firms. **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity** **Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Markets** by the overconfidence hypothesis, the effects are largest in firms removal of the CEO from power, which is likely to be difficult and mergers an empirical matter. CEOs can avoid equity-financing., i.e. in the least equity dependent CEOs strongly prefer cash- or debt-financed mergers to stock deals **CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firms Equity: Firm Equity** Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? Overconfident U.S.

firms spent more than \$3.4 trillion on over 12,000 mergers during the last two decades. . . 216) [or the first available of common equity (item 60) plus preferred stock par value . One shortcoming of Post-Longholder is its lack of power.

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment - University of H2: The power that CEOs exercise in firms determines their overconfidence. This study share ownership of CEOs do not affect their overconfident behavior. . than women, especially in finance related matters (Fox et al., 1994). . Overconfident top executives most likely have superior equity intensity, option intensity, and. **Managerial Duties and Managerial Biases - University of California** CEO Power and Overconfidence and the Firm:s Equity: Firm Equity Financing and CEO Stock Transactions: Does CEO Power and Overconfidence Matter? by

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